The
release of the US embassy and consulate cables in Pakistan has also
highlighted how various politicians have lobbied American diplomats for
support. From Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the leader of his own faction of
the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) to former foreign minister Shah Mehmood
Qureshi to the late former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, every major
politician in Pakistan has looked to the diplomats for help. Qureshi,
who was believed to be one of the contenders for the prime minister post
in 2008, is described as “ambitious, and has been self-promoting his
candidacy for prime minister with foreign diplomats.” He also told US
officials, “If I am prime minister, I am not going to be Zardari’s
‘yes-man.’ I am loyal to the party and to Zardari, but I am my own man.”
In January 2008, Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) leaders also asked the
US to change their perceptions about the party. Mustafa Kamal noted that
the US had not condemned human rights violations in Karachi during the
1990s, and the ambassador said that while there was a perception that
the MQM was more of a criminal group than a political party, the US had
noted MQM’s efforts to improve its image and activities. The cable
states: “Saying that the MQM was now popular and had an expanding power
base, Kamal urged that the US ‘stop ignoring us’.” Farooq Sattar and
Haider Abbas Rizvi also urged the same, and Sattar asked for US
government assistance “in convincing the Canadian immigration service to
stop listing the MQM as a terrorist organisation”. The Pakistani
military, for its part, made its feelings about US pressure very clear.
In 2006, then Director of Military Operations Brigadier General Nasser,
upset at suggestions that Pakistan was not doing enough in the war on
terror, told visiting US officials: “When you say ‘we are not doing
enough,’ we say ‘go to hell’.”
The interior minister also believed that Saudi Arabia was ‘working to unseat Zardari’. Saudi Arabia’s dislike of Zardari has been documented in several cables by WikiLeaks revealing several reasons – Saudi Arabia feared a ‘Shia triangle’ in the region and Zardari’s relationship with Iran. Malik also claimed the MQM was meeting with the PML – N and Sharif was “pressuring CJ [of Pakistan (CJP)] Iftikhar [Muhammad] Chaudhry to disqualify Zardari.” Malik also said that the NRO expiry would not affect Zardari, and that the CJP would not revoke Zardari’s presidential immunity. Malik claimed that if the CJP did so, “the interior minister can instruct prosecutors to dismiss charges in any court case.” Patterson noted, “Malik’s views on Zardari’s legal troubles presuppose that CJP Iftikhar Chaudhry will be bound by normal interpretations of the law and precedent. Such an assumption ignores Chaudhry’s penchant for ignoring both in recent rulings and his personal animosity towards Zardari.”
According to a leaked memo, Kayani,
however, had told Patterson in March 2009 that he may have to urge
Zardari to resign if conditions deteriorated. The memo also said that
Kayani had hinted at ‘disquiet among his corps commanders who believe
Zardari is corrupt and has not been paying enough attention to
Pakistan’s economic and security challenges.’ The ambassador recounting
her meeting with Malik noted that his belief that “ISI Director General
(DG) Lt-Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha was unilaterally behind the push to oust
Zardari” and Kayani was not involved was “either naive or intentionally
misleading”. Patterson wrote that it would be “impossible for Pasha to
move without Kayani’s acquiescence.” Pasha had also spoken to Patterson
in early 2009 about his concerns over Zardari. Rehman Malik suggested in
the meeting that the way to deal with military pressure would be for
Zardari to make changes in the military hierarchy. Malik, in the memo
notes, “proposed that Zardari recreate the deputy chief of army staff
position and move Pasha into that position in March 2010. Zardari could
then elevate Pasha to COAS in Oct 2010 on the expiration of Kayani’s
term. Malik suggested that Kayani could then be made chairman of the
joint staff.” However, the move did not go ahead. Kayani’s term as chief
of army staff was extended this July for three more years. Pasha’s term
as DG ISI was extended for a year in March 2010.
The interior minister also believed that Saudi Arabia was ‘working to unseat Zardari’. Saudi Arabia’s dislike of Zardari has been documented in several cables by WikiLeaks revealing several reasons – Saudi Arabia feared a ‘Shia triangle’ in the region and Zardari’s relationship with Iran. Malik also claimed the MQM was meeting with the PML – N and Sharif was “pressuring CJ [of Pakistan (CJP)] Iftikhar [Muhammad] Chaudhry to disqualify Zardari.” Malik also said that the NRO expiry would not affect Zardari, and that the CJP would not revoke Zardari’s presidential immunity. Malik claimed that if the CJP did so, “the interior minister can instruct prosecutors to dismiss charges in any court case.” Patterson noted, “Malik’s views on Zardari’s legal troubles presuppose that CJP Iftikhar Chaudhry will be bound by normal interpretations of the law and precedent. Such an assumption ignores Chaudhry’s penchant for ignoring both in recent rulings and his personal animosity towards Zardari.”
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