1998: 1965 War Operation Gibraltar Role of SSG Para Commandos Col SG MEHDI: Mian
Arshad Hussain, a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan had demanded a
judicial probe in the events leading to the 1965 war. On Oct. 23, 1977,
Mian Sahib addressed the nation through a statement released to the
Pakistan Times, Lahore. I quote; Following Col. Mehdi's articles on the
1965 war, there has been an expression of interest in this momentous
event as can be seen from the letters which appeared in this columns. In
my opinion, the 1965 war bred the 1971 war and is thus an important
contributory cause of the latter and the tragic events that have
followed the conflict. Is it not time that a full-fledged inquiry was
held into the causes, the conduct and the consequences of 1965 war? Mian
Arshad Hussain had excellent reasons to demand a probe into the
concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 war' as he was Pakistan's High
Commissioner at Delhi during that fateful period. He sent a warning on
4th September 1965 to the foreign office of Pakistan through Turkish
Embassy that the Indians were planning to attack Pakistan, on 6th
September. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary through a press
statement acknowledged that such a warning was indeed received by the
Foreign Office. But the debate on this warning issue' remained
inconclusive, in that Aziz Ahmed maintained that the warning was
received two days after war had already started! Only probe by a high
powered judicial commission can separate shadows from the substance.
1965 war :'Without deliberate intent' : In
1965, the Pakistan Army found itself at war with India without
deliberate intent which achieved a measure of surprise....'This is the
opening sentence of the foreword by General Zia-ul-Haq, written for The
Pakistan Army, War 1965' compiled by Major General Shauket Riza from
hundreds of interviews and documents. General Mohammed Musa who
commanded the Army in the 65 War, gives a graphic account of how the
Indians surprised the GHQ, the C-in-C and the Supreme Commander Field
Marshal Ayub Khan on September 6, 1965. Narrates Musa Khan on page 48 of
his book My Version'. India launched her ignominious, undeclared and
blatant aggression on our homeland at about 0330 hours on 6 September.
The Supreme Commander was informed about the invasion by Air Commander
Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who was on duty at the Air Defence
Headquarters at Rawalpindi on night of 5/6 September. Indian troop
movements across the frontier had been reported to him by the border
posts of the PAF Wireless Observer wing. The President then rang me up
to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received any information about the
Indian attack and the whereabouts of the field army that morning'.
How did the GHQ allow Indians to Achieve Surprise?: Let
General Musa describe the genesis of the surprise' Indian attack on 6th
September in his own words. The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major
General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad
Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed
situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian
held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there and to help, on a
long term basis, the locals in organising a movement with a view to
eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power. Continues
the former C-in-C on page 6 of his book, the sponsors and supporters of
the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the
plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India' ....... To the
extent that the concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held
Kashmir, code named Gibraltar' was the brain-child of the ministry of
Foreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth. But
General Musa, the C-in-C, assumed full responsibility for the
development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire
operation. This is graphically stated by him on page 35 of his book:
After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched
in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General
Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation,
code-named Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ and within the broad
concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes
in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in
Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August, 1965 under our overall
control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present.
He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General
Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence
(Brigadiers Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively). No civil
official attended this briefing. Broadly the plan envisaged, on a
short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of
communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms
to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement
there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The
push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as
one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt
our activities would have an escalating effect.
When Akhtar Malik was pointing out on the sand model the various targets of the raiding parties of Gibraltar, the President did say why don't you go for Akhnur also? Akhtar Malik replied that, too, could be considered, but it was not raided because no Gibraltar force had been organised for that purpose.
Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north. The simple truth emerging from the preceeding statement of General Musa is clear cut, in that, while the concept of Gibraltar' did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa, whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half heartedly and non serious manner
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