ABSTRACT: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY about the legitimacy of the recent Tomahawk bombing of the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. Two of Pres. Clinton's friends—Bobbie May, an oil and gas businessmen, and H. H. Brookins, a bishop at Nashville's African Methodist Episcopal Church—visited Khartoum, Sudan, the week that American Tomahawk cruise missiles destroyed the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant, on August 20th. The Sudanese plant, depicted by the White House as a chemical-warfare facility, was one of 2 targets in a retaliatory raid against Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden, who was linked to the bombings of American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania earlier that month; Tomahawks were also fired at sites in Afghanistan suspected to be terrorist training camps under the control of bin Laden. The writer describes public statements made on Aug. 20th by both Pres. Clinton and his national-security adviser, Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger. Berger claimed the Administration had "physical evidence" that the plant made chemical weapons: the C.I.A. had obtained a soil sample outside the plant which contained Empta, a key ingredient in nerve gas. The writer claims that many military and intelligence officials have questioned the legitimacy of the bombings, which occurred shortly after Clinton had completed his grand-jury appearance in the Monica Lewinsky matter. Bobby May and Bishop Brookins--who had personally toured the Al Shifa plant a few days before the bombing and had seen no evidence of chemical weapons--were convinced that the Administration had made a mistake. The Tomahawk mission was seen by many as a failure: bin Laden wasn't killed, and questions continue about the plant's validity as a target. This failure was a by-product of the secrecy that marked the White House's planning for the bombings. The majority of officers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not briefed about the bombings until the day before the raids. Also excluded was F.B.I. director Louis Freeh. Attorney General Janet Reno felt there was insufficient evidence to justify the bombings and urged the White House to delay the raids. There are also serious questions within the C.I.A. about the validity of its own analysis. The writer interviewed several senior military and Pentagon officers who criticized the President's decision to exclude senior military personnel from his decision-making process. Some military officers have questioned the effectiveness of the raids. The officers examined Sandy Berger's role in the planning . Most think that Berger was too hasty in his decision to advocate bombing, and that this haste was due to pressure from Clinton for a strong response. The writer describes Clinton's troubled relationship with the F.B.I. and Louis Freeh, and he details the F.B.I.'s concern that it was not given adequate warning of the planned attack. The writer says that bin Laden was tipped off to the coming attack after the White House evacuated the American Embassy in Pakistan, thus giving him a chance to flee before the bombing began. The writer interviewed intelligence operatives who disputed the White House's version of the intelligence information it had received about upcoming terrorist attacks by bin Laden. After the bombing, Sudan produced evidence that the Al Shifa plant was involved in the processing and marketing of antibiotics and other beneficial drugs. On Sept. 21st, the "Times" reported that some Administration officials had conceded that they had no evidence directly linking bin Laden to the Al Shifa plant at the time of the attack. Thus, the Administration placed its entire justification for the bombing on the Empta found in the soil near the plant. The writer interviewed an inspector in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons who questioned the C.I.A.'s account of the retrieval and analysis of the Empta. Sandy Berger, in a Sept. 18th press briefing, blamed the Khartoum regime for Sudan's troubles, but the writer calls his view "simplistic." The writer ends by quoting a former State Department official, who said that if Clinton hadn't been in severe personal trouble, he wouldn't have authorized the Tomahawk raids
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